Terminating a Marriage in Nebraska by Keller, Marvin D.
Nebraska Law Review
Volume 43 | Issue 1 Article 9
1963
Terminating a Marriage in Nebraska
Marvin D. Keller
University of Nebraska College of Law
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.unl.edu/nlr
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law, College of at DigitalCommons@University of Nebraska - Lincoln. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Nebraska Law Review by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@University of Nebraska - Lincoln.
Recommended Citation
Marvin D. Keller, Terminating a Marriage in Nebraska, 43 Neb. L. Rev. 156 (1964)
Available at: https://digitalcommons.unl.edu/nlr/vol43/iss1/9
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TERMINATING A MARRIAGE IN NEBRASKA
I. INTRODUCTION
As the basic unit in society,' the family has long been the
subject of considerable legal attention. Such attention has been
primarily concerned with the procedures for establishing and dis-
solving the marital status. Because of a greatly increased divorce
rate and a more complete understanding about the causes of marital
breakup, increasing criticism is being directed toward the failure
of statutory divorce provisions to adapt to the changing attitudes
of society.2 An example of this is Nebraska where except for the
enforcement of support,3 the law of divorce remains basically the
same as it was in 1856. 4 It is the purpose of this comment to re-
examine those portions of Nebraska divorce law pertaining to the
actual termination of marriage, and to analyze such law in the light
of modern understanding and attitudes.
II. TERMINATION OF THE MARRIAGE
A. TiE STATUTES
Absolute divorce, which always has been recognized in the
United States, was not permitted under the early canon law. The
canon law viewed divorce as sinful and provided only for a pro-
cedure whereby parties could legally separate without severing the
bonds of matrimony: divorce a mensa et thoro.5
1 "The institutions comprising the marriage and family system have their
roots in the elemental needs of the very first social groupings formed
among men. They have been and are universal in some form among
all known societies." HERTZLER, AMERICAN SOCIAL INSTITUTIONS 224
(1961).
2 See, e.g., VIRTUE, FAMILY CASES mI COURT (1956); Alexander, Let's Get
the Embattled Spouses out of the Trenches, 18 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 98
(1953); Bradway, Divorce Litigation and the Welfare of the Family, 9
VAND. L. REV. 665 (1956); Kahn & Freund, Divorce Law Reform? 19
MoDEm L. R.v. 573 (1956); Johnson, Suppressed, Delayed, Damaging and
Avoided Divorces, 18 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 72 (1953); McCurdy, Divorce
-A Suggested Approach with Particular Reference to Dissolution for
Living Separate and Apart, 9 VAND. L. REV. 685 (1956).
3 E.g., Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act, NEB. REV. STAT.
§§ 42-701 to -721 (Reissue 1960).
4 Neb. Laws c. 52, p. 277 (1856).
5 Mueller, Inquiry into the State of a Divorceless Society, 18 U. PITT. L.
REV. 545, 545-52 (1957).
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The ecclesiastical courts, under the canon law, adhered to the
concept of marriage as a sacrament which no man could dissolve.
At the same time, however, it was recognized that in certain situa-
tions the spouses should not be forced to live together. To come
within these situations and obtain a divorce a mensa et thoro re-
quired that one spouse be guilty of either adultery or cruelty. The
limited divorce for adultery rested on the basis that a heinous
crime had been committed against the marital relationship, and the
innocent spouse should not be required to continue performance
of marital obligations. 6 A limited divorce for cruelty could be ob-
tained only where the acts complained of constituted a "danger to
life, limb, or health. ' 7 It was a protective device.
When divorce jurisdiction was taken from the ecclesiastical
courts and placed in the hands of the secular courts,8 the above
grounds and desertion were the only ones adopted by statute.9
Apparently the common law tradition of adversary proceedings
also carried over.' 0
Only after the Protestant movement had gained considerable
strength was absolute divorce recognized." The first provisions
for absolute divorce were equally strict, the grounds for the action
not being extended at all.' 2 The requirement that a serious offense
be committed as a condition precedent to the granting of a divorce
still predominated. Even desertion had to be willful and con-
tinuous over a stated period of time,13 Grounds under which
absolute divorce could be obtained were gradually extended, but
present divorce laws, with few exceptions, 14 continue to require
some degree of guilt or fault on the part of one of the parties. 5
6 Mueller, supra note 5, at 553.
7 Evans v. Evans, 1 Hag. Con. 35, 161 Eng. Rep. 466 (1790).
8 The Matrimonial Causes Act, 1857, 20 & 21 Vict. c. 85.
9 The Matrimonial Causes Act, 1857, 20 & 21 Vict. c. 85.
10 Rheinstein, Trends in Marriage and Divorce Law of Western Countries,
18 LAw & CONTEMP. PROB. 3, 4 (1953).
11 Rheinstein, supra note 10, at 3-19.
12 The Matrimonial Causes Act, 1857, 20 & 21 Vict. c. 85.
JAcosS & GOEBEL, DomEsTic RELATIONS 419 (4th ed. 1961).
14 The grounds which do not require guilt are insanity, incompatibility
and living apart and separate. See ARE:. STAT. ANN. § 34-1202 (1953)(living apart and separate); NEB. REV. STAT. § 42-301 (Reissue 1960)(insanity); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 22-7-1 (1953) (incompatibility).
15 NEB. RE V. STAT. §§ 42-301 and -302 (Reissue 1960).
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The first statute in Nebraska was enacted in January, 1856,
and contained essentially the same elements as the present day
divorce law.16 Grounds for obtaining a divorce, under present as
well as past provisions, are adultery, cruelty, desertion, abandon-
ment, insanity, drunkenness, three or more years imprisonment,
a sentence of life imprisonment, and physical incompetence at the
time of marriage. 17 It is apparent that all except insanity are based
on the fault theory without regard to the actual state of the mar-
riage. The Nebraska Supreme Court summed up this legal attitude
by stating: 18
A divorce or legal separation must be grounded on legal fault with-
in the grounds enumerated in the statutes. ... It is not the province
of the courts to grant such decrees for sociological reasons....
It is not for this court to do what it deems best for the parties.
Divorce is traditionally treated in much the same manner as other
adversary proceedings between a guilty party and a party sup-
posedly injured thereby. The spouse seeking to terminate the
marriage must file a petition alleging a marital offense which con-
stitutes statutory grounds for divorce.19 The husband or wife then
becomes the defendant in the action and enters his defense, or, as
is more often true, fails to defend.20 Proof of the defendant's guilt
is required, and, if established, the divorce is granted to the com-
plaining spouse.
That the fault theory is firmly entrenched in Nebraska law
is indicated by the fact that the commission of a marital offense
cannot be proven with the confessions or admissions of the spouses
alone. The Nebraska statutes specifically provide that the testimony
of the parties must be corroborated by other witnesses. 21 This re-
quirement is a direct parallel of the criminal law requirement
that there be corroborative evidence to support a defendant's con-
fessions.22 It should be noted, however, that, even in the criminal
law, a confession in open court need not be corroborated.
16 Neb. Laws c. 52, p. 277 (1856).
17NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 42-301 and -302 (Reissue 1960).
Is Shoemaker v. Shoemaker, 166 Neb. 164, 168, 88 N.W.2d 221, 226 (1958);
Birth v. Birth, 165 Neb. 11, 14, 84 N.W.2d 204, 205 (1957); Robinson v.
Robinson, 164 Neb. 413, 417, 82 N.W.2d 550, 553 (1957). (Emphasis
added.)
19 NEB. REV. STAT. § 42-307 (Reissue 1960).
2 0 JACOBSON, AMERICAN MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE 120, table 57 (1959).
2 1 NEB. REV. STAT. § 42-335 (Reissue 1960).
22 Gallegos v. State, 152 Neb. 831, 43 N.W.2d 1 (1950).
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The hardship which the corroboration requirement can work is
aptly illustrated by Birth v. Birth,23 where the plaintiff testified
that her husband "had brutally made grossly excessive demands
upon [her] for sexual relations which had so affected her physical
and mental health as to make it impossible to continue the marriage
relation. '24 The divorce was denied because there was no corrobora-
tive evidence. It thus appears that a party seeking to terminate his
marriage must have at least one witness to verify even the most
personal and intimate events in marriage.
B. SOCIETAL ATTITUDE
While divorce law has remained stable over the years, vast
moral and social changes have taken place. Between 1865 and today
the national divorce rate has increased nearly eight times,2 5 indicat-
ing that the stigma once attached to such proceedings has lost the
steadfast support of the public.
One significant factor in the increased acceptance of divorce
has undoubtedly been the emancipation of women. Yereas an
important consideration initially was to restrain a man from obtain-
ing a divorce and leaving his spouse as a burden on society, the
same is no longer of such primary importance. Women are no
longer totally dependent upon their husbands for support. They now
constitute a significant portion of the working force,2 can hold
title to real estate,27 have the ability to enter into contracts,28 and
can bring suit in their own names.29 They are able, therefore, to
be relatively independent in maintaining themselves. The effect
of this independence has been propounded by one writer who
states:30
Although we do not know the figures, we can and must assume that
the great event of female emancipation has brought with it an in-
23 165 Neb. 11, 84 N.W.2d 204 (1957).
24 Id. at 11-12, 84 N.W.2d at 204.
2 5 JACOBSON, op. cit. supra note 20, at 90, table 42.
26 There were over twenty-two million women employed in 1959 out of
a total labor force of about forty-eight million. This compares with less
than two million out of a total labor force of about thirteen million in
1870. U.S. BUREAU Or THE CENsus, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNTED
STATES 205, No. 261, No. 262 (1959).
2 7 NEB. REV. STAT. § 42-201 (Reissue 1960).
2 8 NEB. REV. STAT. § 42-202 (Reissue 1960).
2 9 NEB. REV. STAT. § 42-201 (Reissue 1960).
3 0 Rheinstein, The Law of Divorce and the Problem of Marriage Stability,
9 VANi. L. REV. 633, 654 (1956).
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crease in the number and rate of cases of factual marriage breakup.
Since it is probable that at least some of these cases have been
followed by formalization through divorce, we are justified in
assuming that to some extent the rise in the number and rate of
divorce is connected with the change in the social position of the
female half of the population.
Another important factor which has contributed to an increas-
ing divorce rate is the high mobility of today's society. Most families
presently live in a society where they are relatively anonymous,
and there are few friends or relatives permanently close by.8 1 With-
out the discipline engendered by a stable, closely knit society,
couples are less restrained in their desire to separate.8 2
Also indicative of the changing social attitude is the increas-
ing questioning of the guilt requirement in divorce actions.33 This
mounting stream of criticism has come from lawyers, sociologists
and psychologists asserting that: (1) the fault requirement has
no basis in fact because marriage breakup is usually the fault of
both spouses; 34 and (2) the legal grounds for divorce are technical
terms which do not define the real causes of marital discord.35
Such criticism is based on the growing sociological evidence
that most marriages fail, not because of one spouse's act which
constitutes a ground for divorce, but because of conflicting per-
sonality factors which cause a gradual deterioration of the marriage
relationship36 until at some point the essentials of the marriage
relationship are destroyed.37 In this situation, the fault require-
ment is likely to cause one party to commit an offense which pro-
vides grounds for divorce.38 The marriage relationship, however,
is, de facto dead before such grounds are provided. Yet, in the
divorce court, the spouse with grounds for divorce is adjudged "in-
31 HERTZLER, AMERICAN SOCIAL INsTITUTIONs 245-52 (1961).
82 HERTZLER, supra note 31, at 245-52.
33 See note 2 supra.
34 ERNST & LOTH, FOR BETTER OR WORSE 24 (1951); MERTON & NISBET, CON-
TEMPORARY SOCIAL PROBLEMS 437 (1961).
35 JAcoBsoN, AMERICAN IARIAGE AND DIVORCE 126 (1959); GOODE, AFTER
DIVORCE 114 (1956); Johnson, Suppressed, Delayed, Damaging and
Avoided Divorces, 18 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 72, 85 (1953).
36 MERTON & NISBET, op. cit. supra note 34, at 425-37.
37 This is a test that many courts use to determine whether a divorce
should be granted. The test is ordinarily used in the cruelty situation,
See e.g., DeWaal v. DeWaal, 148 Neb. 756, 29 N.W.2d 371 (1947).
38 GOODE, op. cit. supra note 35, at 136; MERTON & NISBET, op. cit. supra
note 34, at 435-37.
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nocent" and the other "guilty" even though these terms are mean-
ingless when related to the cause of marital disintegration.
Present divorce actions are seldom contested and, when there
is a contest, it usually centers around alimony, support and custody
of children.39 This lack of adversity in a supposedly adversary pro-
ceeding serves to further weaken the value of the present statutory
grounds for divorce. Over half of the divorces in Nebraska are
granted on the ground of cruelty, for example, because cruelty is
easy to prove in an uncontested action,40 and probably attaches
less stigma to the defendant than would other grounds. Thus, a
complaining spouse tends to choose grounds on the ease of procur-
ing a divorce and the relative lack of stigma, even though, under
the fault theory, other grounds might be more appropriate. As
stated by one writer: 41
The "causes of divorce" however defined, bear little relationship
to the tabulations of divorce complaints as they appear in divorce
suits. In general the rule in such suits is that the legally most
effective and the morally least accusatory grounds are asserted in
the suit.
New York, where the only ground for divorce is adultery,42
illustrates the inherent weakness of the fault theory as a basis for
the law. Apparently few cases of actual adultery come before the
New York courts. The allegation of adultery, however, is often
employed as a sham for the purpose of terminating a marriage.43
One spouse, usually the husband, agrees to provide evidence of
adultery for the other. The evidence of inclination and opportunity
is usually provided by professional correspondents, 44 and is placed
before the court by the so-called innocent spouse. No defense is
entered and the divorce is granted.45
39 JACOBSON, op. cit. supra note 35, at 120.
40 In a uncontested divorce action where the grounds are cruelty, the
questions which will be asked the plaintiff have been reduced to a
formula, and the answers are as predictable. See Vm=Us, FAMILY CASES
iN CouRT 89-90 (1956).
41 GOODE, op. cit. supra note 35, at 114. (Emphasis added.)
42 N.Y. Dom. REL. LAw, C.P.A. 1147 (1957).
4 3 JACOBSON, op. cit. supra note 35, at 115-16.
44 "As a matter of fact, it has been common knowledge for several decades
that the situation in New York has resulted in the appearance of a new
remunerative occupation - that of the professional co-respondent."
JACOBSON, op. cit. supra note 35, at 115.
4 5 JACOBSON, op. cit. supra note 35, at 115-16.
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III. DEFENSES TO DIVORCE ACTIONS
Although the usual divorce action is non-contested, there are
occasional situations where one spouse decides to contest.46 If the
defendant wishes to contest an action for divorce he may have one
or several defenses available, any of which would defeat the action
in Nebraska. There are four main defenses-recrimination, 47 col-
lusion,48 condonation,49 and insanity5 -- which, if proven, act as an
absolute bar to divorce.51 These defenses, like the grounds for the
action, are based upon or arise from the fault theory.
A. RECRIVINATION
Recrimination is used to bar a decree of divorce where both
parties are guilty of a marital offense constituting grounds for
divorce. This defense existed under the canon law and has been
carried over into the statutory law of most states.52
Courts have advanced a number of justifying reasons for con-
tinued use of the defense against a guilty plaintiff. Since divorce
arises in equity, the most familiar doctrine relied upon is that the
40 There can be a number of reasons for defending a divorce action. The
defendant (1) may want to continue living with his spouse; (2) may
have religious objections to divorce; (3) might be afraid that he will
not be permitted to visit or see his children; (4) might consider defend-
ing a method of avenging injured feelings; or, (5) might not, in the
husband's situation, wish to be required to make the alimony and
support payments.
4 7 NEB. REV. STAT. § 42-304 (1960).
48 NEB. REv. STAT. § 42-304 (1960).
49 Sewell v. Sewell, 160 Neb. 173, 178, 69 N.W.2d 549, 553 (1955). "An
obstacle to the success of the case of appellee is condonation by her
as a result of the foregoing recited facts of any and all breaches of
marital duties by appellant to the time of their separation on the day
of the institution of this case."
5oStephens v. Stephens, 143 Neb. 711,. 716, 10 N.W.2d 620, 623 (1943);
Anderson v. Anderson, 89 Neb. 570, 574, 131 N.W. 907, 908-09 (1911);
Kirkpatrick v. Kirkpatrick, 81 Neb. 627, 116 N.W. 499 (1908); Scheick v.
Scheick, 5 Neb. (Unof.) 142, 97 N.W. 474 (1903); Walton v. Walton, 57
Neb. 102, 77 N.W. 392 (1898).
51 "No divorce shall be decreed in any case when it shall appear that the
petition or bill therefor was founded in or exhibited by collusion be-
tween the parties, nor where the party complaining shall be guilty of
the same crime or misconduct charged against the respondent." NEB.
REV. STAT. § 42-304 (1960).
52 Gradwohl, The Doctrine of Recrimination in Nebraska, 37 NEB. L. REv.
409, 410-11 (1958).
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plaintiff must come into the action with "clean hands."53 Under
this doctrine, equitable relief is intended only for an innocent in-
jured party, and the court will not grant relief to one who has con-
tributed to the injury.54
Another justification frequently used is that the parties are
in pari deZicto.55 Under this doctrine, where each party is equally
at fault the courts will leave the case as they find it. Although this
is much like the "clean hands" justification, there is a distinction.
"Clean hands" is based on the principle that the court cannot pro-
vide relief to a guilty party. The pari delicto justification is based
on a theory of equal guilt which affords neither party greater
rights than the other so neither is entitled to relief as against the
other.56
Since marriage has been considered to be in the nature of a
contract, some courts, in denying relief, occasionally say there has
been a breach of mutually dependent convenants.5 7 This analogy
to contract law is applied even though the marriage relationship
is essentially a status rather than a contract.58
The Nebraska statute dealing with this defense provides,
"No divorce shall be decreed in any case ... where the party com-
plaining shall be guilty of the same crime or misconduct charged
against the respondent. 59 The clear language requires that for mis-
conduct to be a defense it must be the same misconduct-adultery in
an action for adultery, etc. The Nebraska Supreme Court, however,
has greatly expanded the scope of the statute by stating, "[I]f the
53 Malkan, Petitioners' Fault in Matrimonial Actions, 106 U. PA. L. REV.
52, 61 (1957).
54 "To obtain a release a vinculo matrimonii, the applicant must be without
reproach, and however guilty the defendant, if the applicant is charge-
able either with similar guilt, or of an offense to which the law attaches
similar consequences, the relief must be denied . . . ." McKnight v.
McKnight, 5 Neb. (Unof.) 260, 267, 98 N.W. 62, 65 (1904).
55 1 POMEROY, EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE §§ 402, 403 (4th ed. 1918).
56 Juda v. Juda, 327 Mich. 321, 41 N.W.2d 883 (1950).
57 Beeby v. Beeby, 1 Hag. Ecc. Rep. 789, 162 Eng. Rep. 755 (1799) ; Conant v.
Conant, 10 Cal. 249, 70 Am. Dec. 717 (1858).
5S8 "The doctrine of recrimination has been rested . . .upon the contract
theory that he who seeks redress for the violation of a contract resting
on mutual and dependent covenants must himself have performed the
obligations on his part .... [I]t ignores the fact that marriage is not a
mere private contract but rather a status .... " Burch v. Burch, 195
F.2d 799, 809 (3d Cir. 1952).
59 NEB. REv. STAT. § 42-304 (1960). (Emphasis added.)
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conduct of both parties to a divorce action has been such as to
furnish grounds for divorce, neither is entitled thereto although the
conduct of one has been grossly more culpable than the other."60
It is apparent, therefore, that the court, disregarding the limita-
tion in the statute, has adopted a theory closely akin to the "clean
hands" doctrine in applying recrimination. 61
B. COLLUSION
The guilt requirement, which serves as the basis for present
divorce law, has given rise to another kind of guilt which will also
bar a decree.62 Parties who find their marriage failing because of
sociological and psychological factors, often beyond their under-
standing and control, have no remedy unless one of them has
committed a marital offense sufficient to constitute grounds for
divorce. As in the New York divorce proceedings, the requirement
of fault often provokes collusive activity between parties attempt-
ing to provide such grounds.
Collusion is a bar to divorce which arises in Nebraska when
the husband and wife have agreed to withhold facts from the court
to avoid recrimination, or where they have agreed to testify falsely
to provide the necessary grounds for a divorce.63 Where both
parties have acted to defraud the court, under the rules of equity,
either is estopped to plead the collusion as a defense.64 To permit
such fraudulent representations, however, would encourage dis-
respect for the legal process and destroy the concept of justice upon
which equity is based. The court, therefore, will, on its own motion,
set aside a collusive divorce or refuse to grant the divorce if the
collusion is brought to the court's attention prior to rendering the
divorce decree.65
60 Studley v. Studley, 129 Neb. 784, 787, 263 N.W. 139, 140 (1935).
61 An analysis of all the Nebraska cases involving recrimination shows a
great deal of judicial inconsistency in the application of the doctrine.
It is, therefore, rather difficult to determine which justification the
Nebraska Supreme Court uses. See Gradwohl, The Doctrine of Recrimi-
nation in Nebraska, 37 NEB. L. REV. 409 (1958).
62 JACOBS & GOEBEL, DOMESTIc RELATIONS 480-87 (4th ed. 1961).
63 Winder v. Winder, 86 Neb. 495, 125 N.W. 1095 (1910); Mohr v. Mohr,
81 Neb. 499, 116 N.W. 267 (1908); Branson v. Branson, 76 Neb. 780, 107
N.W. 1011 (1906); Davis v. Hinman, 73 Neb. 850, 103 N.W. 668 (1905);
Wisdom v. Wisdom, 24 Neb. 551, 39 N.W. 594 (1888).
64 Hartigan v. Hartigan, 272 Ala. 67, 128 So. 2d 725 (1961).
65 Hartigan v. Hartigan, 272 Ala. 67, 128 So. 2d 725 (1961).
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C. CONDONATION
Condonation may be a defense where the defendant spouse can
prove that the injured spouse forgave the alleged offense."' This
defense is based on an estoppel theory, the condoning spouse being
deemed to have waived the grounds for divorce. Since the injured
party willingly forgave the offense, it is reasoned that no offense
was actually committed against the marriage relationship. 67 The
guilty spouse supposedly relied on the forgiveness and should not
have the offense charged against him later.
.Condonation, however, may be avoided, for the condoned act
may be revived by subsequent acts of the same nature by the
forgiven spouse. According to the court, the injured spouse only
forgives" conditionally, the condition being that the forgiven spouse
will not subsequently commit such an offense against the marriage
relationship.08  -
This defense can have the effect of preventing reconciliations.
If the injured spouse wishes to attempt to save the marriage, he
is placed in the position of having to make a choice between at-
tempted reconciliation and preservation of the ground for divorce.
Should an attempted reconciliation fail, the injured spouse is unable
to sue for divorce because of the defense of condonation. 9
D. INSANITY
Insanity during commission of a marital offense does not
exist as a defense under the statutes. It is a court conceived de-
fense resting on the principle that an insane person cannot be
guilty because he can form no intent to commit the offense.70
66 Sewell v. Sewell, 160 Neb. 173, 178, 69 N.W.2d 549 (1955).
67 Greco v. Greco, 2 W. W. Harr, (Del.) 242, 121 Atl. 666, (1923); Christen-
sen v. Christensen, 125 Me. 397, 134 Ati. 373 (1926).
68There seems to be no real revival problem in Nebraska. The usual
statement in other courts is that the condonation is conditional upon
the implied promise of the guilty spouse to treat his mate with "conjugal
kindness." Because of the "conjugal kindness" condition it is usually
held that a lesser offense will revive the condoned offense. Lawton v.
Lawton, 77 R.I. 333, 75 A.2d 199 (1950); Hilbert v. Hilbert, 168 Md.
364, 177 Atl. 914 (1935). Nebraska, however, appears to require an act
which would in and of itself provide grounds for divorce to revive the
condoned offense. Cowan v. Cowan, 160 Neb. 74, 69 N.W.2d 300 (1955);
Hodges v. Hodges, 154 Neb. 178, 47 N.W.2d 361 (1951); Wright v. Wright,
153 Neb. 18, 43 N.W.2d 424 (1960); Eicher v. Eicher, 148 Neb. 173, 26
N.W.2d 808 (1947).
69 Johnson, supra note 35, at 80.
70 Kirkpatrick v. Kirkpatrick, 81 Neb. 627, 116 N.W. 499 (1908).
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Under the fault theory, therefore, the injured spouse has no grounds
for a divorce.
Few cases have arisen in Nebraska in which insanity was
claimed as a defense. One case has applied insanity as a defense to
a divorce action based on desertion.71 The court, using the require-
ment that the desertion be willful, denied the divorce saying that
the defendant could not willfully continue to desert, if before the
end of the statutory two year period he became insane. Other
cases appear by way of dictum to approve of insanity as a defense,
but the Nebraska Supreme Court has never defined the elements
necessary to prove insanity in a divorce action. Presumably, since
divorce is based on a showing of guilt, the proof of insanity would
be comparable to the tort and criminal law requirements.7 2
IV. ANALYSIS OF FAULT THEORY
As shown above, the provisions for divorce have, since the
ecclesiastical courts, been predicated on the proof of grounds, which
in turn required a showing of guilt and innocence. The procedures
and rules growing out of this requirement have remained stable
throughout years of vast social change, and it becomes pertinent,
therefore, to consider their continued validity. An examination
of the results flowing from the fault theory will aid in determining
whether its retention is desirable, and also indicate any areas in
need of alteration.
A. GENERAL CONSEQUENCES OF NEBRASKA DIVORCE LAW
The public and adversary nature of a divorce proceeding under
the fault theory has two unfortunate results. First, it is a humiliat-
ing ordeal for both parties to the action. The "guilty" spouse hears
the testimony of his misconduct from much the same position as a
criminal defendant,73 and the "innocent" spouse must publicly
reveal personal and intimate abuses to prove the necessary grounds.
This humiliation caused by the criminal overtones and notoriety
leads to a second result-the spouses are reluctant to relate more
than the facts necessary to establish grounds. Such reluctance to
testify appears to be borne out by studies which show that less
71 Kirkpatrick v. Kirkpatrick, 81 Neb. 627, 116 N.W. 499 (1908).
72See e.g., Stephens v. Stephens, 143 Neb. 711, 716, 10 N.W.2d 620 (1943);
Anderson v. Anderson, 89 Neb. 570, 577, 131 N.W. 907 (1911).
7 3 DESPERT, CHILDREN OF DIVORCE 189 (1953); Bradway, Divorce Litigation
and the Welfare of the Family, 9 VAND. L. REV. 665, 672 (1956).
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than 10% of the cases are contested.7 4 A contest effectively
heightens the atmosphere of criminality, whereas an uncontested
proceeding allows the parties to keep a greater portion of their,
private lives from public observation.
Even where a contest is involved, the reluctance to testify
forces the court to render its judgment with few pertinent facts 5
Only a limited account of the actual causes behind a marital
breakup is presented to the court, and to expect equitable de-
terminations in such a situation places much reliance on the clair-
voyant abilities of the court.
Where a determination of the guilt of one or both of the spouses
is the controlling issue, the courtroom, at times, becomes an arena
for name calling and the airing of minor grievances.7 6 Where chil-
dren are involved, their support and protection is shifted to the
background while they become one of the primary objects of the
action.77
The resentment of one partner toward the other in the failing
marriage also takes its toll of the relationship between the parents
and children. A man and woman who have hurt each other in
marriage may unconsciously continue their war with each other
through a divorce and afterward with the child as a pawn ....
'The mother wins the custody'-This is the way it is put in both
legal and popular parlance, as though divorce were a battle in
which the reward of victory is the child. And all too often it is
a battle, whether or not the true issues appear on the surface.
Not only is the welfare of the child largely ignored under
the present state of divorce litigation; but the welfare of the spouses,
as such, does not appear to be an important issue. Divorce provides
for a termination and a chance for a fresh start, but both parties
are often left with a feeling of frustration and failure.7 8 With their
marital failure compounded by a guilt hangover from the recent
litigation, they could hardly be expected to look forward to new
matrimonial contacts with any great optimism. Yet the human
drive for companionship requires that they attempt such a con-
tact.7 9 This is borne out by statistical studies which show that the
74 JACOBsoN, AMERICAN MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE 120 (1959).
75 See generally, Bradway, supra note 73.
76 Alexander, Let's Get the Embattled Spouses out of the Trenches, 18
LAw & CONTEMP. PROB. 98 (1953).
77 DESPERT, op cit. supra note 73, at 28. (Emphasis in the original.)
78 GOODE, AFTER DIVORCE 173-201 (1956).
79 ANSHEN, THE FAMILY: ITs FUNCTION AND DEsTiNY 3-38 (1949); HERTZLER,
AIVIERICAN SOCIAL INSTITUTIONs 224-58 (1961).
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divorcee has a far greater propensity to marry than the single
person who has never been married. 80 Considering the ordeal
which divorce litigation involves, however, there is certainly some
question about how readily the divorcee will adjust to a subsequent
marriage.8 '
The present fault theory presents yet another problem in its
conflict with the state's interest in the welfare of its citizens. By
enacting statutes purporting to regulate divorce, the state has in-
dicated an interest in marital stability.82 The present guilt require-
ments for divorce, contrary to this interest, do not contribute to
marriage stability and may in fact promote instability and con-
ditions which are harmful to the parties involved.83 The law does
not now provide a remedy for the marriage which becomes bank-
rupt because of incompatible personalities. Rather it requires that
the relationship deteriorate to a point where one spouse is driven
to commit an act constituting grounds for divorce.8 4 The period of
time which can elapse between the psychological breakup and legal
dissolution can be quite long.85 Where there is a lengthy delay
80 GOODE, op. cit. supra note 78, at 207; JACOBSON, op. cit. supra note 74 at 82.
81 JACOBSON, op. cit. supra note 74, at 150.
82 "If statistics on divorce would reflect the actual occurrence of marital
breakup, marriage stability would be perfect in all those countries
in which the divorce rate is zero, i.e., in those countries which do not
have the institution of divorce at all .... Does this fact indicate, how-
ever, that no Italian, Spanish or Brazilian husband ever abandons his
wife, that no wife ever runs away from her husband, that no couples
in these countries ever separate, that no married man maintains a mis-
tress and no married woman ever has a lover? Anyone who has even
a fleeting acquaintance with the social structures of these countries
will make no such allegation." Rheinstein, The Law of Divorce and the
Problem of Marriage Stability, 9 VAND. L. REV. 633, 643-44 (1956). See
also, Mueller, Inquiry into the State of a Divorceless Society, 18 U.
PrrT. L. REV. 545 (1957).
8-3 "Yet divorce is not the costliest experience possible to a child. Unhappy
marriage without divorce- what we call emotional divorce- can be
... far more destructive to him than divorce." DESPERT, op. cit. supra
note 73, at 18. (Emphasis in the original.)
84 ' We suggest, then that in our society the husband more frequently
than the wife will engage in behavior whose function, if not intent,
whose result, if not aim, is to force the other spouse to ask for the
divorce first. Thereby the husband frees himself to some extent from the
guilt burden, since he did not ask for the divorce." GOODE, op. cit. supra
note 78, at 136. (Emphasis in the original.)
85 "Many American (and foreign) jokes suggest that divorces in this
country are precipitate and based upon whim. The evidence is clear,
however, that divorcees do not characteristically dash for the nearest
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between "emotional divorce" and legal divorce, the psychological
effect on parents as well as on children is likely to be harmful.86
The suffering of children where the divorce is emotional, but not
openly expressed, is greater. Loyalties are divided, security is
deeply shaken, and besides there is anxiety about the uncertain,
the unexpressed and inexpressible. The child of emotional divorce
cannot ask to have his confusions clarified and his fears explained
away. He does not know what he fears and has no words for what
he does not understand. The unidentified situation between his
parents is far more threatening to a child than a realistic situation,
however painful, which is squarely faced together with his parents.
There is a tendency for the child reared in the emotional
divorce situation to carry the psychological impact of that life
into adulthood.87 Having lived through one such situation, he may
approach his own marriage with a negative attitude. Thus, in
preventing legal divorce except on a showing of guilt, the state
seems actually to be working against the best interests of its
citizens.
B. RESULT OF THE FAULT THEORY AS RELATED TO THE DEFENSES
The defenses of recrimination, collusion, condonation and in-
sanity were discussed in an earlier section to show that they
shared a common fault theory basis. At this point it is pertinent
to determine their relationship to marriage stability.
1. Recrimination
Strict application of recrimination has the result of legally
enforcing marriages after they have reached the highest degree of
disintegration. Deterioration of the marriage relationship has
progressed considerably beyond minor personality conflicts, and
both parties have committed serious breaches of the marital bond.88
Whether with conscious intent or not, each spouse has seriously
injured the other. Refusal to provide relief under such conditions
can only have a destructive effect on the mental welfare of the
spouses and their children.
Furthermore, the fact that recrimination is available tends to
promote collusion between the spouses who feel that divorce is
lawyer when the first spat occurs. Divorces are preceded by a long
period of conflict, and the final action is the result of a decision and
action process that lasts on the average about two years." GOODE, op cit.
supra note 78, at 137.
86 DESPERT, op. cit. supra note 73, at 25.
8 7 MERTON & NisBET, CoNTEMPoRARY SocrAL PROBLEMS, 425 (1961).
88 See discussion of the elements of recrimination, supra note 52 and follow-
ing.
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the only practical solution to their problems. Knowing that re-
crimination could be available, the defendant spouse, if he desires
divorce, is induced to conceal facts from the court. Or a defendant
husband who has a recriminatory defense available may threaten
to use it, with the intent of coercing his wife into requesting in-
adequate alimony and support payments.8 9
The modern attitude toward divorce and the results of sociologi-
cal and psychological studies which indicate that there is rarely,
if ever, an innocent spouse militate against retention of the de-
fense.90 Divorce should have the purpose of benefiting the members
of the family through dissolution of a relationship which, because
of a constant atmosphere of bickering and dissension, is detrimental
to the welfare of the individual members of the family. The use
of recrimination as a defense forecloses the possibility of protecting
members of the family, particularly children, from the worst kind
of marital discord.
2. Collusion
Collusive action between the spouses cannot, of course, be
condoned; for such action constitutes an attempt to defraud the
courts. Continued activity of this nature leads to open contempt
for the legal process. 91 But, as has been previously indicated, the
primary factor which leads to collusive action is the guilt require-
ment. The collusion problem, therefore, clearly illustrates the in-
89 "The spouse who more desperately seeks an end to a hopeless union
is penalized by the ability of the other spouse to prevent a divorce
through the assertion of a recriminatory defense, and the more un-
scrupulous partner may obtain substantial financial concessions as the
price of remaining silent." DeBurgh v. DeBurgh, 39 Cal. 2d 858, 869,
250 P.2d 598, 604 (1952).
90 "Yet it is perfectly apparent to any student of divorce that a divorce
seldom can be painted in black and white; both partners are guilty
and both are innocent as a rule." ERNST & LoTH, FOR BETTER OR WORSE 17
(1951). See also, Bradway, The Myth of the Innocent Spouse, 11 TUL.
L. Rzv. 377 (1937).
91 "The courts have thus come to tolerate collusive practices through which
consent divorces can be easily obtained in spite of their reprobation by
the official law. Such practices have grown up in a good many places,
but quite especially in this country, where unorganized trends, even of
large numerical strength, are finding it particularly difficult to influ-
ence the legislatures. This discrepancy between the law of the books
and the law in action, which we find in so many states, has, through
its tolerance or promotion of collusive practices and prejury, developed
into a serious threat to the morals of the bar and the respect for law
among the public." Rheinstein, Trends in Marriage and Divorce Law
of Western Countries, 18 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 3, 19 (1953).
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ability of divorce laws resting on fault theory to effectively deal
with marital problems in a realistic manner.
Although collusion should be discouraged, it is submitted that
the method of reducing its incidence should not be the refusal to
grant a divorce decree. Such refusal may be an effective punish-
ment of the guilty parties, but marriage should not be utilized as
a punitive device. Furthermore, the punishment affects innocent
parties as much as it does the spouses. Children, though never in-
volved in the collusion, are punished as severely as their parents
because they are forced to remain in a family atmosphere permeated
with strife.
The solution to the collusion problem lies not in punishing the
parties, but in curing the defects in divorce theory which tend to
promote such action. If divorce law rested on a basis which en-
couraged complete disclosure to the court, the reasons for resorting
to collusion would disappear.92
3. Condonation
One of the primary goals in divorce practice should be to en-
courage reconciliation between the spouses where it is practicable
to do so. 93 Attempts to promote reconciliation in some jurisdictions
have been quite successful.9 4 The defense of condonation, however,
has a directly contrary affect. That is, the spouse who has grounds
for divorce is forced to choose between reconciliation and forfeiture
of grounds for divorce. Should the injured spouse attempt to ef-
fectuate a reconciliation and fail, the grounds for divorce would
have been condoned, and such condonation could be pleaded in
bar of the divorce action.95 Such is the anomolous result of basing
divorce on a consistent legalistic fault concept.
92 The present state of divorce law does not encourage complete or truthful
disclosure to the courts because of the emphasis on grounds and de-
fenses. The spouses are not permitted to ask for a divorce merely
because their marriage is a failure. They must first establish grounds
for the divorce and in so doing avoid doing any act which could bring
a defense into play. The easier way is to allege false grounds in a non-
contested action. If, however, the emphasis were taken away from the
technical grounds no purpose can be served in resorting to collusive
practices. See Rheinstein, supra note 91.
93 Bradway, Divorce Litigation and the Welfare of the Family, 9 VAND. L.
REv. 665, 680-84 (1956); Chute, Divorce and the Family Court, 18 LAw
& CONTEmP. PROB. 49 (1953); Mudd, The Social Worker's Function in
Divorce Proceedings, 18 LAw & CONTEMP. PROB. 66 (1953).
9
- HARPER & SKOLNICK, PROBLEMS OF Tm FAMnL 489 (1962); Mudd, supra
note 93, at 70.
95 See, supra note 69.
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4. Insanity
The insanity defense flows logically from the fault theory,
for legally an insane spouse cannot be guilty of a marital offense.
An additional public policy consideration which may have in-
fluenced the introduction of this defense is a desire to protect the
insane spouse and to assure that he is provided with adequate
support and medical attention 6 The sane spouse should have the
duty to provide such support and special care-but not by refusing
to terminate the matrimonial bonds.
Nebraska has statutory provisions for the appointment of a
guardian ad litem to protect an insane spouse's interests.9 7 The
court has the power to enforce the support duty, regardless of the
existing marital status, and no advantage accrues from the refusal
to grant a divorce decree.98
It is difficult to understand how an actual marriage relation-
ship can be said to exist under such circumstances despite judicial
refusal to separate the parties legally. The insane spouse is in-
capable of participating in an on going marriage relationship,
such as rearing children, providing for the family's security, and
providing marital companionship. The sane spouse, unless he can
prove incurable insanity as a ground for divorce,99 is tied to a
partner who can contribute nothing to a successful marriage.
V. CAUSES OF DIVORCE
An examination of its consequences has shown that the fault
approach to divorce problems has failed to provide a satisfactory
solution. The reason it has failed stems from the erroneous as-
sumption that the grounds enumerated in the statutes are the causes
of marriage failure. In reality, the causes of marital disintegration
are complex and so dependent upon the emotional makeup of the
individual spouses that it is impossible to isolate a single factor
and say that it is the cause of a given marriage failure.100
Furthermore, sociological studies and statistical analyses of
the factors which are likely to be involved in destroying a mar-
riage show no similarity to the present statutory grounds. Such
96 E.g., NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 42-302.02, 42-318.01 (Reissue 1960).
97 NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 38-114, 42-302.02 (Reissue 1960).
98 NEB. REv. STAT. § 42-318.01 (Reissue 1960).
99 NEB. REv. STAT. § 42-301 (Reissue 1960).
100 See notes 34 & 35 supra.
COMMENTS
studies show, for example, that: 101 (1) marriages contracted within
a short time after the spouses meet are more likely to end in divorce
than if they had known each other for a year or two; (2) marriages
across class lines meet serious problems of adaptation which results
in a higher probability of divorce; (3) interfaith marriages are
more likely to fail; (4) children of an unhappy marriage encounter
greater difficulties in the marriage relationship than children of a
happy marriage; and (5) where both spouses want children and
children are born, the marriage is less likely to end in divorce.
From these sociological studies, the legal grounds emerge as
symptoms that the marriage has failed rather than as actual causes
of the failure. Since the present legal grounds are merely symptoms
of marital breakup, and the actual causes are too complex to be
reasonably made legal grounds, the proper approach to sound
divorce regulation should involve an examination of the soundness
of the relationship itself. An attempt should be made by the court
to determine whether reconciliation is possible, for research indi-
cates that many of the present divorces could be prevented through
effective marriage counseling.10 2 Should it be determined that
reconciliation is not a proper solution, marital ties should be severed
with as little pain as possible. It is with the dual intention of facili-
tating reconciliation and providing an effective remedy where
attempted reconciliation would not solve the marital difficulties,
that the recommendations of the following section are advanced.
VI. RECOMMENDED DIVORCE PROVISIONS FOR NEBRASKA
A. The opportunity to contract a hasty marriage has been shown
to be a contributing factor to a high divorce rate.10 3 It is, there-
fore, recommended, that there be a required waiting period from
the time of application for a marriage license until the time when
marriage could be contracted. Such period should be of sufficient
duration to reasonably forestall marriages contracted without ade-
quate consideration by the parties. An additional requirement pro-
viding for consultation with a marriage counselor during the wait-
ing period would be beneficial. A visit to a professional marriage
counselor would increase the prospective spouses' awareness of
the problems which the marriage relationship would face. It would
allow them to more completely understand where personality
10 1 MERTON & NISBET, op. cit. supra note 87, at 425.
102 HARPER & SKOLNICK, Op. Cit. supra note 94, at 70.
103 MERTON & NISBET, op. cit. supra note 87, at 425.
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clashes are likely to occure and to re-examine the desirability of
marriage in the light of such knowledge. 04
B. All legal grounds presently required for divorce and all
defenses to an action for divorce should be abandoned, and the fault
theory replaced by a concept based upon the welfare of the parties
involved. This would reduce the strife during the action because
neither party would be charged with guilty conduct. Such charges
tend to lead to counter charges and a corresponding increase in
tensions not conducive to effective reconciliation attempts. If the
court finds that divorce would be likely to promote the welfare
of the spouses and their children, the divorce should be granted
whether or not either or both spouses are guilty of a marital offense.
C. The first step in a divorce action should be the filing of
intention to petition for divorce with the court by either or both
parties. This notice should contain the bare statement of intention
with no allegations of guilt. Filing of intention contrary to filing
a petition for divorce would not be an act of such finality that the
parties would feel constrained to proceed to final dissolution, and
they would consequently be in a better mental state to consider a
reconciliation.
D. Upon the filing of intention the court should appoint a
social case worker, a member of the court's permanent staff, to
investigate the family background, the desirability of granting
custody of any children to a particular spouse, the support require-
ments of the children and the wife, and the ability of the husband
to provide support. A report of these factors should be filed with
the court and become part of the evidence to reduce much of the
present conflict which is involved in the determination of these
questions. In this way neither spouse would feel that the other
was attempting to use the proceedings for monetary gain or revenge.
E. After filing the notice of intention, neither spouse should be
permitted to petition for divorce during a waiting period of six
months. During this period the spouses should be required to meet
individually and together with a professional marriage counselor,
a member of the court's permanent staff, to obtain guidance toward
a satisfactory reconciliation. After six months the marriage coun-
104This restriction might be open to the objection that it provides no
remedy for the pregnant single girl. However, this would appear to be
one of the areas where hasty, ill-considered marriages occur with a high
rate of frequency. It would appear, therefore, that it might be better
for the child to be born out of wedlock than to put three people in the
corrosive situation which occurs in marriages which are not firmly based.
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selor should file a report with the court indicating whether or not
divorce would be advisable, and if the time was insufficient to
complete counseling, the court could, in its discretion, extend the
waiting period an additional six months. This requirement would
provide the spouses with an opportunity to understand the factors
which, are involved in the marriage conflict and to assess the ad-
visability of pursuing a remedy other than divorce.
F. At the end of the waiting period either or both of the spouses
could petition for divorce. The petition should state the date on
which notice of intention was filed, that an attempt had been made
to effect reconciliation, and that divorce is still desired.
G. As soon as possible after the petition for divorce, the court
should hold a closed hearing to determine the advisability of ter-
minating the marriage. Because it is a closed hearing, the spouses
would be more likely to make a full disclosure, whereas, if it were
public, one or both might be reluctant to relate facts considered
embarassing or personal. The desire of the spouses and the report
of the marriage counselor should control in determining whether
or not a divorce should be granted.
H. If the divorce be granted the social case worker's report
should be determinative of support, alimony and custody, subject
to additional evidence presented by the spouses. The court should,
as is presently provided, have continuing jurisdiction to modify
such decrees upon a showing of changed circumstances. 105
I. The dissolution should be final as of the date of the decree.
The purpose of the waiting period after divorce is to give the parties
an opportunity to reconsider, and this has been provided for in
recommendation E. above.
- J. Where but one spouse is in the jurisdiction, a special pro-
vision should provide for the following:
(1) A filing of notice of intention as provided above.
(2) The same waiting period as above.
(3) The absent spouse should be notified of the intention and
be given an opportunity to submit to the jurisdiction of the court.
If the absent spouse submits to the jurisdiction of the court, the
procedure for marriage counseling should be as outlined above.
(4) If the absent spouse fails to submit to the court's jurisdic-
tion, social case workers should investigate and submit a report
105 N E. REv. STAT. §§ 42-312, 42-324 (Reissue 1960).
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concerning alimony, support and custody. Alimony and support
should be decreed and enforced as is presently provided. 10 6
(5) At the end of the waiting period where the absent spouse
has failed to appear, the divorce would be granted and proper ali-
mony, support and custody decreed.
K. It is further suggested that in both situations the traditional
case name be eliminated. Instead of the usual Doe v. Doe, which sug-
gests adversary proceedings, the case should be entitled Divorce of
Doe. This, of course, is not essential; but, divorce under the above
plan is not an adversary proceeding and the case name should not
indicate that it is.
VII. CONCLUSION
The legal fault requirements are predicated on the erroneous
assumption that marriage breakup is a direct result of actions
which constitute grounds under present divorce statutes. Initially,
fault theory may enforce the marriage bond, but the harmful
effects of such enforced marriage may actually lead to increased
family instability and emotional strain.10 7
The recommendations herein advanced should aid in relieving
many of the harmful effects of divorce as they remove family prob-
lems from the area of traditional court room litigation. Marriage
is primarily a social status, and these recommendations have at-
tempted to approach marital difficulties from the concept of solving
a social problem with the sociological and psychological tools avail-
able. 08 The cost of this program can hardly be expected to be low,
but the interest in promoting the welfare of the family unit is more
than sufficient to outweigh the increased administrative costs.
Marvin D. Keller '64
10 6 N EB. REV. STAT. §§ 42-701 to -721 (Reissue 1960).
107 DESPERT, op. cit. supra note 73, at 18.
108The suggestions advanced herein are open to the objection that they
would constitute an invasion of the individual's privacy. However, the
marriage relationship is governed by the laws of the state and exists
subject to those laws. The state has an overriding interest in the welfare
and social stability of its citizens. The law, as it exists now, has failed
in great part to accomplish its goal-the promotion of marital stability.
The fault concept with respect to family relationships appears, in fact, to
have promoted instability of the marital relationship. No set of laws or
rules could provide a final solution to the problem of marital instability,
but the suggestions advanced herein allow a more realistic approach
to the problem than that of the arbitrary, fault-based, pattern embodied
in the present divorce law.
